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Integrating	what	and	for	whom?	Financialisation	and	the	
Thames	Tideway	Tunnel	
	
Abstract	
	The	Thames	Tideway	Tunnel	(TTT),	often	referred	to	as	the	Thames	super	sewer,	is	currently	one	of	the	largest	infrastructure	projects	underway	in	any	European	city.	 Costing	 an	 estimated	 £4.2	 billion,	 the	 sewer	 connects	 London’s	 Victorian	sewerage	network	with	 the	Thames	Wastewater	Treatment	Works	 at	Beckton.	The	latter	facility	has	been	described	as	the	UK’s	Water-Energy-Food	nexus	poster	child,	 for	 its	combination	of	desalination	facilities,	green	energy	generation	and	wastewater	treatment.	While	physically	connected	to	the	Beckton	plant,	the	TTT	is,	paradoxically,	designed	with	an	apparent	disregard	for	the	water-energy	nexus.	If	 the	 Beckton	 plant	 represents	 a	 nexus-based	 vision	 of	 integration	 –	 what	Macrorie	and	Marvin	(in	this	issue)	refer	to	as	Mode	2	Urban	Integration	–	the	TTT	harks	back	to	a	view	of	Urban	Integration	carried	from	the	Victorian	era	through	to	the	present	moment.	What	unites	the	two	projects,	and	what	undergirds	the	transformation	of	the	hydrosocial	cycle,	is	a	financial	model	more	focused	on	the	extraction	of	rents	from	Thames	Water’s	consumers.	Thames	Water’s	dismissal	of	genuinely	integrated	alternatives	appears	guided	more	by	the	financialisation	of	the	urban	integrated	ideal	than	by	what	is	needed	to	respond	to	London’s	broader	environmental	 needs.	 Contesting	 the	 project,	 therefore,	 will	 involve	 slicing	through	the	various	claims	to	integration,	going	beyond	the	many	proposals	for	
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evidence-based	alternatives,	and	capturing	the	transformations	being	wrought	by	finance’s	entry	into	infrastructure	provision.		Keywords:	financialisation,	water	infrastructure,	London,	rent	extraction,	urban	integration		 	
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Introduction		London’s	 hydrosocial	 cycle	 is	 undergoing	 the	 largest	 transformation	 in	 over	 a	century.	 Infrastructure	has	been	bundled	and	unbundled	 in	a	 range	of	projects	that	reengineer	and	reintegrate	flows	of	water,	wastewater	and	energy.	Thus,	in	2012,	the	first	major	desalination	plant	in	the	UK	was	constructed	at	Beckton,	just	downstream	 from	 the	 Thames	 Barrage.	 Then,	 in	 January	 2016,	 Mayor	 Boris	Johnson	opened	the	Lee	Tunnel,	the	deepest	tunnel	ever	constructed	in	London	and	at	the	time	the	most	ambitious	infrastructure	project	ever	embarked	on	by	the	privatized	water	industry	in	the	UK.	Far	surpassing	both	of	these	schemes	in	scale	and	ambition	is	the	£4.2	billion	plan	to	construct	a	16-mile	“super	sewer”	underneath	the	Thames.	With	a	diameter	equivalent	to	the	width	of	three	double	decker	buses,	this	vast	tunnel	will	transport	stormwater	runoff	and	raw	sewage	from	Acton	to	Abbey	Mills,	enabling	the	combined	sewage	to	be	carried	through	the	 Lee	 Tunnel	 to	 Beckton.	 Construction	 began	 on	 this	 super	 sewer,	 known	officially	as	the	Thames	Tideway	Tunnel	(TTT),	in	2016	and	is	expected	to	last	for	7-8	years.			When	 viewed	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 the	 Beckton	 plant,	 Thames	Water	 –	 and	 the	infrastructural	changes	it	is	pushing	through	–	resembles	the	multi-utility	firms	re-emerging	 in	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 world	 (see	 Florentin	 in	 this	 issue).	 In	 its	desalination	plant,	the	utility	has	therefore	addressed	concerns	around	the	Water-Energy-Food	nexus	through	ensuring	that	Fats	Oils	and	Greases	can	supply	the	energy	needed	 for	 the	 purification	 of	 saltwater	 or	 even,	 perhaps	 in	 the	 future,	
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greywater.	 Drinking	 water	 can,	 in	 short,	 be	 made	 from	 waste.	 Drawing	 on	Macrorie	 and	 Marvin’s	 (in	 this	 issue)	 typology,	 the	 Beckton	 plant	 can	 be	interpreted	as	a	site	for	Thames	Water’s	experiments	in	Mode	2	Urban	Integration	(UI)	where	formerly	separate	infrastructure	types	are	bundled	together	through	a	 new	 vision	 of	 the	 smart	 utility.	 However,	 while	 physically	 linked	 to	 and	dependent	on	the	Beckton	plant,	the	TTT	appears	to	be	in	sharp	contrast,	relying	more	 on	 the	 Victorian	 engineering	 legacy	 of	 Joseph	 Bazalgette,	 and	 a	 heavily	criticised	model	of	top-down,	infrastructure	heavy	responses	to	complex	needs.			Both	the	nexus	style	Mode	2	UI	at	Beckton	and	the	top-down	Mode	1	UI	in	the	TTT	would	not	have	emerged	were	it	not	for	the	process	of	financialisation	that	has	profoundly	influenced	London’s	hydrosocial	cycle	(Allen	and	Pryke	2013;	Loftus	and	March	2016).	 This	 process	mirrors	 other	 trends	 identified	 by	Halbert	 and	Attuyer	(2016)	around	“the	financialisation	of	urban	production”	(ibid;	see	other	papers	 in	 the	 Special	 Issue	 of	 which	 Halbert	 and	 Attuyer’s	 is	 a	 part).	We	will	therefore	 argue	 that	 there	 is	 no	 necessary	 causal	 relationship	 between	financialisation	and	Mode	2	Urban	 Integration:	 indeed	 if	 finance	can	guarantee	stable	revenue	streams	it	is	just	as	likely	to	favour	older	visions	of	UI	as	it	is	to	favour	Mode	2	nexus	visions.	In	slight	contrast	to	Williams	et	al	(in	this	issue),	for	whom	“the	burgeoning	popularity	of	the	nexus	concept	illustrates	a	broader	trend	towards	 the	 increasing	 internalisation	 of	 environmental	 externalities	 into	 the	processes	of	urbanisation	and	capital	accumulation”,	our	argument	is	that	under	financialisation	 the	 question	 of	 environmental	 externalities	 is	 a	 relatively	peripheral	concern.	While	nexus-style	arguments	may	be	appropriated	to	argue	in	 favour	 of	 one	 form	 of	 infrastructure	 over	 another,	 the	 more	 important	
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consideration	for	investors	is	how	best	to	expand	the	terrain	over	which	rents	can	be	captured.	The	demand	is	therefore	for	more	and	larger	infrastructure	rather	than	for	necessarily	smarter	infrastructure.	The	arguments	for	more	integrated,	smarter	alternatives	to	the	TTT	have	in	fact	been	summarily	dismissed	in	spite	of	gaining	 the	 support	 of	 some	 high-profile	 individuals,	 from	 the	 former	 head	 of	OFWAT	to	the	chief	project	assessor	to	the	TTT.	There	appears	little	doubt	in	our	mind	that	cheaper	and	better	solutions	to	the	TTT	exist.	That	these	alternatives	have	not	been	pursued	appears	 to	be	down	 to	 the	particular	manner	 in	which	financialisation	 has	 rejuvenated	 an	 earlier	 model	 of	 Urban	 Integration	 and	enabled	a	continuation	of	the	supply	side	Hydraulic	Mission	that	many	thought	had	collapsed	at	the	end	of	the	twentieth	century.			We	 begin	 by	 more	 clearly	 outlining	 the	 different	 types	 of	 urban	 integration	detailed	by	Macrorie	and	Marvin	(in	this	issue)	before	contextualising	the	Thames	Tideway	Tunnel	within	the	various	planning	decisions	that	have	given	rise	to	it.	Next,	we	look	at	the	integration	of	Bazalgette’s	legacy	into	a	programme	of	Urban	Integration	that	resembles	Macrorie	and	Marvin’s	Mode	1	Urban	Integration.	In	contrast	Mode	2	alternatives,	which	build	on	the	principles	of	Integrated	Water	Resources	Management,	appear	to	have	been	rejected	in	spite	of	strong	evidence	favouring	 their	 development.	 The	 decision	 to	 construct	 what	 the	 Chair	 of	 the	Public	Accounts	Committee,	Margaret	Hodge	describes	as	“a	great,	big,	honking	tunnel”	appears	 to	have	been	guided	more	by	 the	needs	of	 finance	 than	by	 the	needs	 of	 Londoners	 and	 the	 hydrosocial	 cycle	 of	 which	 they	 are	 a	 part.	 We,	
	 6	
therefore,	conclude	by	questioning	what	is	being	integrated	through	the	Thames	Tideway	Tunnel	and	for	whom1.		
Mode	1	and	Mode	2	Urban	Integration	As	demonstrated	by	the	papers	in	this	issue,	cities	in	the	global	North	and	global	South	are	witnessing	a	shift	towards	more	integrated	solutions	to	infrastructure	provision.	Many	utilities	 now	work	 across	multiple	 domains,	 enabling	 “diverse	ecological,	 financial,	 operational	 and	 institutional	 interactions,	 overlaps,	interdependencies	 and	 hybridisations	 between	 the	 different	 infrastructure	domains	 that	 shape	 urban	 development,	 environments	 and	 metabolism”	(Monstadt	and	Coutard,	this	issue).	This	trend	can	be	distinguished	from	earlier	forms	of	 integration	represented	in	“the	modern	infrastructural	 ideal”	(Graham	and	Marvin	2001).	Macrorie	and	Marvin	(this	issue)	refer	to	the	former	as	Mode	1	UI	a	“dominant	ideal	of	modern	planning	in	the	West	[which]	idealised	the	concept	of	the	orderly	unitary	city.”		Such	a	model	of	the	unitary	city	was	plunged	into	crisis	at	the	end	of	the	twentieth	century	for	a	variety	of	political,	cultural	and	economic	reasons,	as	well	as	due	to	changing	planning	practices,	and	transformations	in	the	technologies	themselves.	The	splintering	urbanism,	so	brilliantly	captured	in	Graham	and	Marvin’s	(2001)	work	of	the	same	name	refers	precisely	to	the	break-up	of	Mode	1	UI.	For	water	and	sanitation	provision,	 the	 implications	of	 this	breakdown	in	 the	unitary	city	ideal	were	many.	Demand-side	solutions	began	to	replace	supply-side	solutions	
																																																								1	The	research	is	based	on	a	thorough	review	of	secondary	sources,	and	is	part	of	a	broader	project	researching	the	financialisation	of	the	hydrosocial	cycle	in	London.	
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as	 the	 Hydraulic	 Mission	 to	 keep	 increasing	 supplies	 appeared	 to	 falter.	Furthermore,	 privatization	 and	 corporatization	 undermined	 the	 abilities	 of	municipally	owned	utilities	to	provide	a	coherent	service	within	defined	regions.			It	might	have	seemed	unlikely,	given	the	splintering	of	the	unitary	city	ideal	that	integration	would	 once	 again	 become	 the	 guiding	maxim	 for	 organizing	 cities.	Nevertheless,	as	the	papers	in	this	special	issue	demonstrate,	such	a	return	to	the	integrated	ideal	has	indeed	occurred.	Integration	in	the	current	moment,	however,	needs	to	be	distinguished	from	the	forms	that	preceded	it.	No	longer	is	the	unitary	city	the	model	for	integrated	infrastructures,	rather	integration	is	guided	by	the	efficiency	 savings	 that	 might	 be	 made,	 and	 the	 ecological	 imperatives	 that	necessitate	such	a	shift.	The	need	 for	greater	 resiliency	 in	 the	 face	of	declining	resource	availability,	as	well	as	the	financial	gain	to	be	made	by	using	resources	more	efficiently	 (Williams	et	al.	2014),	appear	 to	have	shaped	this	most	recent	shift.	Mode	2	UI	according	 to	Macrorie	and	Marvin	 (this	 issue)	clusters	around	three	specific	techniques	of	integration:	nexus,	systems,	and	agglomeration	all	of	which	can	be	seen	to	differ	from	the	Mode	1	integration	that	preceded	it.			When	Utility	Weekly	referred	to	the	Thames	Water	Desalination	Plant	–	and	the	attendant	green	energy	generation	and	wastewater	treatment	plant	–	as	a	poster	child	for	the	Water-Energy-Food	nexus	in	the	UK,	it	captures	the	ability	of	Thames	to	move	towards	such	Mode	2	UI	through	integrating	concerns	around	the	nexus	(for	a	lengthier	discussion	of	the	plant	see	Loftus	and	March	2016).	Thames	Water	thus	 appears	 something	 of	 a	 pioneer	 in	 Mode	 2	 integration;	 however,	 while	physically	connected	 to	 the	Beckton	plant,	 the	TTT,	 in	contrast,	appears	 to	 run	
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counter	to	many	of	the	principles	guiding	the	new	wave	of	integration.	Whether	or	not	it	represents	a	return	to	Mode	1	UI	or	not	becomes	an	interesting	question	that	we	 explore	 in	 greater	 depth	 below,	 before	 turning	 to	 the	 financial	model	underlying	the	Special	Purpose	Vehicle	created	to	deliver	the	TTT.	We	begin	with	a	 brief	 contextualization	 of	 the	 TTT	 in	which	we	 consider	 the	 various	 debates	surrounding	its	construction.		
The	Thames	Tideway	Tunnel	in	context	On	the	surface,	 the	need	 for	 the	Thames	Tideway	Tunnel	appears	obvious.	The	Victorian	sewerage	network	designed	by	Joseph	Bazalgette	is	now	overburdened.	London’s	 population	 has	 expanded	 well	 beyond	 Bazalgette’s	 projections,	 and	large	storm	events	frequently	trigger	overflows	at	various	points	along	the	River	Thames	when	combined	flows	of	storm	water	and	raw	sewage	spill	over	a	small	dam	 within	 the	 sewer	 at	 specific	 points	 and	 then	 enter	 into	 the	 river.	 These	discharges	take	place	at	specific	points	along	the	Thames	and	are	referred	to	as	Combined	 Sewer	 Overflows	 (CSOs).	 According	 to	 the	 Department	 for	Environment,	 Food	 and	Rural	Affairs	 (DEFRA)	 (2015a)	 raw	 sewage	discharges	occur	around	50	to	60	times	per	year,	causing	an	annual	average	overflow	of	39	million	 tonnes	 of	 untreated	wastewater	 to	 enter	 the	 Thames	 River	 in	 London.	With	 the	 volume	of	 storm	water	 runoff	 growing	because	 of	 an	 increase	 in	 soil	sealing	–	as	well	as	an	increase	in	the	frequency	and	intensity	of	storm	events	–	many	argue	that	the	problem	of	CSO	discharges	will	become	even	more	serious.	The	 moral,	 ethical	 and	 aesthetic	 arguments	 for	 a	 cleaner	 Thames	 are	 legion:	legislation	from	the	European	Union	has	only	added	a	further	financial	imperative	in	 that	 fines	 will	 be	 imposed	 on	 the	 national	 government	 if	 CSOs	 continue.	
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Summarising	 these	 arguments,	 Thames	 Water	 (2012)	 draws	 attention	 to	 the	environmental	 and	 public	 health	 risk	 of	 sewage,	 to	 the	 fines	 amassed	 when	contravening	the	EU’s	Urban	Wastewater	Treatment	Directive.	The	company	goes	on	to	dismiss	alternatives	as	either	too	expensive	or	too	ineffective.			According	 to	 an	 updated	 cost-benefit	 analysis	 carried	 out	 by	 EFTEC	 and	commissioned	 by	 DEFRA	 (EFTEC	 2015;	 DEFRA	 2015a;	 2015b)	 the	 projected	benefits	 from	 the	 project	 will	 largely	 exceed	 the	 costs	 (based	 on	 a	 120-year	economic	life	of	the	project).	While	whole	life	costs	are	calculated	to	be	around	£4.1	billion,	the	whole	life	benefits	are	expected	to	range	between	£7.4	and	£12.7	billion.	These	benefits	were	calculated	(in	2006	and	updated	in	2015)	through	a	“willingness	 to	 pay”	 of	 households	 in	 the	 Thames	 Tideway	 such	 as	 reducing	adverse	impacts	of	dissolved	oxygen	on	fish,	reduced	sewage	litter	and	odour	or	better	health	outcomes	for	river	users.	The	costs	include:	construction,	operation	and	maintenance	costs,	as	financed	by	Thames	Water	customers;	the	“expected”	value	of	any	contingent	support	from	the	exchequer	in	respect	of	certain	project	risks;	and	traffic	congestion	and	environmental	costs	during	construction	(DEFRA	2015b:	2).	Plus,	 there	are,	according	to	Department	for	Envrionment,	Food	and	Rural	Affairs	(DEFRA)	(DEFRA	2015b:	9),	other	unquantifiable	benefits	including	reduction	 in	 sewer	 flooding	 risks,	 reputational	 issues,	 potential	 difficulties	 in	attracting	investment,	the	protection	of	habitats	and	species	or	employment	and	regeneration	 benefits.	 Among	 the	 benefits	 not	 included	 in	 the	 Cost-benefit	Analysis	 (CBA),	 DEFRA	 (2015b)	 talks	 about	 removing	 future	 development	constraints	(of	some	40,000	homes)	linked	to	sewerage	capacity	over	the	next	20	years.			
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	When	the	problem	of	CSOs	first	came	to	be	looked	into,	a	tunnel	was,	nevertheless,	only	one	of	several	options	being	considered.	Most	of	 the	alternative	proposals	consisted	 of	 smaller	 changes,	 often	 combining	 upgrades	 to	 sewage	 treatment	works	with	more	modest	solutions.	The	full	range	of	options	was	explored	most	thoroughly	in	the	Thames	Tideway	Strategic	Study	(TTSS	2005).	Initiated	in	2001,	the	study	was	chaired	by	the	respected	engineering	consultant	Chris	Binnie	and	brought	 together	Thames	Water,	 the	Environment	Agency,	 the	Department	 for	Environment,	 Food	 and	 Rural	 Affairs	 (DEFRA)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Greater	 London	Authority	 (GLA).	 OFWAT	 –	 the	 economic	 regulator	 for	 the	 water	 sector	 –	participated	 as	 an	 observer.	 The	 group’s	 findings,	 published	 in	 2005,	recommended	a	 series	of	 improvements	 to	London’s	 sewerage	 system.	First,	 it	recommended	upgrades	to	five	of	London’s	tidal	sewage	treatment	works.	Second,	it	recommended	constructing	the	Lee	Tunnel	to	avoid	the	worst	CSO.	Finally,	the	group	recommended	construction	of	the	Thames	Tideway	Tunnel	(TTT).			Although	published	in	2005,	little	progress	was	made	on	the	TTT	until	November	2011	when	 the	 Abbey	Mills	 route	was	 finally	 released	 for	 public	 consultation.	Then,	in	February	2013,	a	full	planning	application	was	submitted.	Based	on	the	recommendations	of	the	planning	inspectorate	(although	overriding	some	of	its	concerns)	the	UK	government	approved	plans	for	the	TTT	on	12	September	2014.		If	the	need	for	a	solution	to	CSOs	is	clear,	it	is	less	obvious	why	alternatives	to	the	TTT	–	alternatives	that	might	provide	more	integrated	responses	to	the	needs	of	London	–	have	been	so	summarily	dismissed,	in	spite	of	growing	criticisms	of	the	
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scale,	 risks	 and	 cost	 of	 the	 project.	Most	 of	 the	 research	 into	 alternatives	was	carried	 out	 as	 part	 of	 the	 earlier	 Thames	 Tideway	 Strategic	 Study,	 which	recommended	for	the	TTT,	so	it	comes	as	something	of	a	surprise	to	find	that	the	author	of	the	report	–	Chris	Binnie	–	is	now	one	of	the	more	high-profile	critics	of	the	 tunnel.	 In	 something	 of	 a	 Damascene	 conversion,	 Binnie	 claims	 that	 the	arguments	he	and	others	had	put	forward	for	the	tunnel	are	now	redundant:	the	steps	already	taken	by	Thames	Water	enabled	the	worst	cases	of	CSO	discharge	to	be	avoided.	Increasing	the	capacity	at	existing	sewage	treatment	works,	as	well	as	increasing	the	capacity	within	the	network	through	constructing	the	Lee	Tunnel,	has	reduced	discharges	to	much	lower	levels	than	expected.	According	to	Binnie	the	River	Thames	now	meets	 the	most	stringent	criteria	of	 the	EU	Wastewater	Framework	Directive.	Binnie	has	gone	on	to	brand	the	TTT	“a	stupendous	waste	of	taxpayer’s	money”	before	stating	“I	do	not	know	why	there	is	such	a	bandwagon	rolling”	(Griffiths	2014).	Such	fierce	invective	from	one	of	the	scheme’s	original	supporters	is	surprising;	however,	Binnie	insists	that	the	original	modelling	used	in	the	2005	Thames	Tideway	Strategic	Study	was	incorrect	and	that	the	decision	to	push	ahead	with	the	tunnel	is	therefore	based	on	erroneous	data	(The	Guardian	14th	 November	 2016):	 “There	 is	 doubt	 about	 quite	 a	 lot	 of	 the	 quoted	 spill	frequencies.	I	don’t	believe	the	model	is	robust,	nor	do	the	people	who	actually	verified	 the	model.”	 Significantly,	 in	 his	 own	 2014	 rebuttal	 of	 the	 case	 for	 the	tunnel,	 Binnie	 (2014:11)	 notes	 that	 the	 original	 Cost	 Benefit	 Analysis	 (CBA)	produced	in	favour	of	the	tunnel	included	the	Lee	Tunnel.	Given	that	this	tunnel	has	now	been	completed	it	seems	wrong	to	ascribe	the	benefits	to	the	TTT.	At	the	cost	of	£0.6	billion	as	opposed	to	the	£4.2	billion	forecast	cost	for	the	TTT	it	does	seem	like	the	Lee	Tunnel	may	well	have	been	something	of	a	bargain.		
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	Binnie	is	only	one	of	several	high-profile	critics	of	the	TTT	“bandwagon”.	Thus,	the	chair	of	the	Public	Accounts	Committee	in	the	House	of	Commons,	Margaret	Hodge,	characterized	 the	 project	 in	 a	 similar	 manner,	 claiming	 it	 to	 be	 “a	 big	 vanity	infrastructure	project”	(CPA	HC	2014	p.13,	Q109)	and	a	“gold-plated	solution	that	will	lumber	London	water	tax	payers	with	a	£80-a-year	extra	bill.”	(p.12,	Q106).	Hodge	later	added:	“I	haven’t	a	clue	–	apart	from	it	being	a	great	big	infrastructure	project	–	why	on	earth	we	are	going	ahead	with	it”	(p.13,	Q106).	Indeed	“[T]here	are	other	options	around	that	are	much	cheaper	and	that	could	be	done	in	a	more	incremental	way	than	a	great,	big,	honking	tunnel”	(p.13,	Q114).		Some	 of	 these	 criticisms	 are	 not	 new	 and,	 as	 far	 back	 as	 2006,	 a	 report	commissioned	by	OFWAT	and	undertaken	by	the	consultancy	Jacobs	Babtie	also	rejected	the	heavy	infrastructure	solution	in	favour	of	a	range	of	less	ambitious	but	no	less	effective	measures.		Even	if	we	are	convinced	that	there	could	be	cheaper	and	better	alternatives	to	the	TTT	our	 intention	 is	not	 to	adjudicate	on	 the	different	sides	 to	 this	debate.	Instead,	what	is	of	greater	interest	to	us	are	the	forms	of	urban	integration	found	within	the	TTT	project	and	the	broader	re-engineering	of	the	hydrosocial	cycle	in	London.	Furthermore,	we	are	 interested	 in	 the	conditions	of	possibility	 for	 the	TTT,	which	appear	to	lie	in	the	novel	financing	mechanisms	developed	by	a	Special	Purpose	Vehicle	(SPV)	now	responsible	for	delivering	and	operating	the	tunnel.	As	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Thames	Water	 Desalination	 Plant,	 the	 financialisation	 of	household	 water	 (Allen	 and	 Pryke	 2013)	makes	 possible	 –	 indeed	 appears	 to	
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positively	encourage	–	the	construction	of	large	infrastructure	projects	whether	they	are	needed	or	not.	Both	a	rejuvenation	of	forms	of	Mode	1	Urban	Integration	and	forms	of	Mode	2	Urban	Integration	are	made	possible	through	the	process	of	financialisation	being	witnessed	in	London.	When	combined	with	nostalgia	for	the	engineering	 achievements	 of	 the	 Victorian	 era,	 with	 particular	 regard	 for	Bazalgette’s	 heroic	 constructions,	 we,	 therefore,	 witness	 the	 birth	 of	 a	financialised	infrastructural	ideal.		
The	neo-Victorian	hydraulic	mission:	Reinventing	Mode	1	Urban	Integration	Behind	the	rationale	of	the	TTT	there	are	recurrent	appeals	to	the	work	done	by	Bazalgette	 in	 the	mid	19th	 century	against	 the	backdrop	of	 the	 “Great	Stink”	of	1858.	Bazalgette’s	massive	plan	to	build	a	sewer	network	system	could	be	framed	as	 an	 early	 example	 of	 the	modern	 infrastructural	 ideal	 or	 the	Mode	1	UI	 that	characterized	20th	Century	water	supply	and	sanitation	in	the	Global	North	and	in	some	parts	of	the	global	South.			Many	commentators,	politicians	and	engineers	have	enthusiastically	likened	the	current	infrastructural	ambition	of	Thames	Water	and	the	TTT	to	the	high-points	of	the	Victorian	era.	Thus,	Stephen	Halliday,	a	historian	of	Bazalgette’s	mid-19th-century	sewer	works	argues	that	the	TTT	is	“a	necessary	extension	to	the	legacy	of	the	Victorians…The	Thames	Tideway	Tunnel	will	be	our	generation’s	legacy	to	our	great-great-grandchildren,	just	as	Bazalgette’s	sewers	were	his	legacy	to	our	generation”	(Tideway	2016).	Boris	Johnson,	former	mayor	of	London,	on	opening	the	 Lee	 Tunnel,	 commented:	 “The	 Victorians	 were	 very	 ambitious	 –	 our	generation	 should	 be	 similarly	 ambitious”.	 And	 in	 a	 move	 clearly	 intended	 to	
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evoke	 comparisons	 with	 the	 ambitions	 of	 the	 Victorians,	 the	 Infrastructure	Provider	licensed	by	OFWAT	to	construct	the	Thames	Tideway	Tunnel	has	taken	the	name	Bazalgette	Tunnel	Ltd.	Without	any	irony,	Waterworld	simultaneously	labelled	 the	 former	 head	 of	 Thames	 Water,	 Martin	 Baggs,	 “a	 modern	 day	Bazalgette”.	 Where	 Joseph	 Bazalgette	 integrated	 stormwater	 and	 raw	 sewage	networks,	thereby	freeing	up	space	for	a	tube	network	and	new	public	spaces,	so	Bazalgette	Tunnel	Ltd	and	Thames	Water	appear	to	be	emulating	his	vision.			Although	Thames	Water’s	broader	neo-Victorian	vision	is	often	cloaked	in	claims	to	 be	 emulating	 the	 ambition	 of	 the	 Victorians,	 the	 new	 tunnel	 is	 remarkably	unambitious	in	the	range	of	problems	it	seeks	to	address,	and	it	is	not	too	difficult	to	see	through	some	of	the	more	sweeping	claims	around	its	supposed	benefits.	While	on	the	surface	appearing	to	integrate	various	needs	of	the	city	and	aiming	to	tackle	ecological	issues	in	the	River	Thames	(Tideway	2016),	the	TTT	fails	on	numerous	 fronts	 to	genuinely	 integrate	 socio-ecological	 concerns,	 tackling	only	one	type	of	pollution	through	one	already	out-dated	infrastructural	solution.	By	failing	to	address	other	aspects	of	the	hydro-social	cycle	and	of	the	broader	water-energy	 nexus,	 the	 tunnel	 undermines	 its	 own	 credentials.	 If,	 as	 it	 sometimes	appears,	the	combination	of	neo-Victorian	hubris	and	financialised	infrastructure	has	trumped	the	nexus	claims	made	around	the	Beckton	wastewater	treatment	works,	 the	 failure	 to	 think	 through	 the	 implications	of	 the	water-energy	nexus	could	 ultimately	 bring	 about	 the	 TTT’s	 downfall.	 Indeed	 the	 degree	 to	 which	energy	generation	at	Beckton	can	keep	up	with	the	demands	of	such	large-scale	schemes	is	far	from	certain.		
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The	dismissal	of	Mode	2	Integrated	Alternatives:	IWRM	A	fundamentally	different	vision	of	integration	–	one	more	akin	to	Macrorie	and	Marvin’s	Mode	 2	 UI	 –	 has	 been	 promoted	 by	 a	 coalition	 of	 environmentalists,	engineers,	 consultants,	 politicians,	 and	 grassroots’	 activists	 seeking	 to	 contest	some	of	the	more	fanciful	claims	surrounding	the	tunnel.	The	proposals	from	this	coalition	are	not	intended	to	evoke	awe	but	rather	to	integrate	solutions	to	a	range	of	different	needs	and	to	do	so	from	the	bottom	up.	Central	to	this	more	modest	vision	 of	 integration	 is	 an	 understanding	 of	 Integrated	 Water	 Resources	Management	 (IWRM)	 as	 a	 necessary	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 London’s	overburdened	sewerage	network.			The	most	vocal	criticism	of	the	project	has	come	from	those	advocating	for	a	blue-green	alternative	to	the	infrastructure	heavy,	engineering-led	approach2.	Critics	have	focused	on:	the	environmental	implications	of	the	project	(Green	2014);	its	huge	cost	 (among	 them,	 the	 future	energy	costs	of	 running	 the	 tunnel)	 (Binnie	2014;	 Bell	 2013);	 the	 conflict	 of	 interest	 between	 Bazalgette	 Tunnel	 Ltd.	 and	Thames	 Water;	 the	 lack	 of	 competition	 during	 the	 bidding	 process;	 and	 the	morally	 ambiguous	 economic	 model	 established	 by	 Thames	 Water	 (Blaiklock	2013).	 These	 critiques	 reveal	 the	 different	 visions	 of	 interconnected	infrastructures	 and	 sustainable	 futures	 as	 found	 in	 both	 the	 top-heavy	 TTT	version	and	the	more	decentralized	vision	proposed	by	advocates	of	IWRM	(Green	2014).	Perhaps	the	main	criticism	of	the	TTT	is	that	it	is	a	Victorian	solution	to	a	twenty-first	century	problem	or	“an	outdated	and	expensive	folly”	as	the	Thames	
																																																								2	For	many	of	the	contributions	penned	by	different	individuals	see	http://cleanthames.org;	and	http://bluegreenuk.com/)	
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Blue	Green	Economy	Group	refers	to	it	(Water	Briefing	2016;	Ashley	2014).	Using	Macrorie	and	Marvin	conceptualization	on	urban	integration,	Mode	1	UI	has	been	favoured	over	the	development	of	Mode	2	UI.			The	 problem	 of	 London’s	 overflowing	 sewerage	 network	 is	 less	 a	 result	 of	increased	volumes	of	raw	sewage	and	has	much	more	to	do	with	the	inability	of	the	combined	sewer	network	to	cope	with	increased	runoff.	The	problem,	in	short,	is	 too	 much	 rainwater	 and	 not	 too	 much	 sewage	 (Ashley	 2014).	 In	 another	refutation	of	the	argument	for	the	TTT,	the	respected	water	economist	and	former	Director	General	of	OFWAT,	Ian	Byatt	(2013),	argues	that	the	problem	lies	with	Thames	Water’s	 failure	 to	 invest	 in	 the	 existing	 sewerage	 network	 leading	 to	groundwater	inundation	of	the	existing	network.			Even	if	Thames	Water’s	diagnosis	of	CSOs	is	valid,	the	degree	to	which	the	tunnel	will	address	the	problem	is	questionable,	as	argued	most	emphatically	by	those	proposing	 Sustainable	 Drainage	 Systems	 (SuDS).	 Bell	 (2013:	 90)	 summarises	SuDS	as	systems	that	“aim	to	manage	surface	water	where	 it	 falls,	and	to	store	water	 locally,	 rather	 than	 discharging	 immediately	 to	 sewers	 and	 the	environment”.	 Although	 still	 regarded	 as	 something	 of	 a	 naïve	 response	 at	 the	time	 of	 the	 Thames	 Tideway	 Strategic	 Study,	 SuDS	 have	 subsequently	 been	adopted	to	great	advantage	in	many	cities	around	the	world	(Zhou	2014)	Instead	of	seeking	to	divert	stormwater	runoff	to	the	sewers	as	quickly	as	possible	SuDS	maximize	the	opportunities	for	stormwater	to	be	absorbed	into	the	ground.	Stovin	et	al.	(2013)	and	Ashley	et	al.	(2011)	argue	that	SuDS	present	many	benefits	over	conventional	 drainage	 systems,	 including	 greater	 resilience	 to	 climate	 change;	
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better	 water	 quality;	 and	 improvements	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 urban	 spaces	 and	amenities.		Runoff	can	be	delayed	through	a	variety	of	different	means	including	swales,	soakaways,	rainbutts,	and	green	roofs	and	walls	(Bell	2013;	Stovin	et	al.	2013).	Although	never	claiming	to	be	against	SuDS	(indeed	it	argues	that	SuDS	is	“essential”	 (Thames	 Water	 2012)),	 Thames	 Water’s	 argument	 is	 that	 such	initiatives	will	never	be	sufficient	to	remedy	the	problem	of	limited	sewer	capacity.	Instead,	it	claims	that	“[t]he	maximum	practical	level	of	retrofit	SuDS	would	take	over	 30	 years	 to	 implement	 and	 cost	 several	 times	 as	 much	 as	 the	 Thames	Tideway	Tunnel.	The	cost	 is	estimated	to	be	at	 least	£13	billion	and	would	not	solve	the	problem”	(Thames	Water	2012:19).	The	most	detailed	comparison	of	the	likely	costs	and	benefits	of	SuDS,	a	review	of	all	available	evidence	by	DEFRA	and	the	 Environment	 Agency,	 would	 appear	 to	 concur	 with	 Thames’	 position.	 The	report	concludes	somewhat	ambiguously:	“although	it	is	clear	from	the	evidence	available	that	SuDS	cannot	meet	the	proposed	water	quality	standards,	concern	is	expressed	by	a	number	of	organisations	regarding	the	balance	of	evidence	and	the	lack	of	proposed	use	of	SuDS	to	improve	water	quality	in	the	Thames	Tideway”	(Environment	Agency	2013:	34).	 In	 short,	 the	evidence	does	not	quite	 seem	to	support	SuDS	yet;	but	stakeholders	should	know	more	about	such	systems,	and	should	also	build	the	use	of	SuDS	into	future	proposals.	For	Bell	(2013)	part	of	the	appeal	of	SuDS	is	that	it	is	a	“low	energy”	water	management	option.	As	she	notes,	the	 TTT	 will	 depend	 on	 far	 higher	 energy	 inputs,	 required	 for	 pumping	 and	treating	 the	 large	 amounts	 of	 sewage	 flowing	 through	 the	 tunnel	 (Bell	 2013;	Binnie	2014)	and	could	well	become	too	costly	to	operate.	Thus,	the	water-energy	nexus	 may	 require	 less-energy	 intensive	 and	 decentralized	 interventions	 in	
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future:	 the	TTT,	 therefore,	 risks	undermining	 the	progress	made	 in	developing	renewable	solutions	at	the	Beckton	wastewater	treatment	plant.		The	arguments	against	the	TTT	and	in	favour	of	more	integrated	alternatives	are	convincing.	 However,	 they	 only	 provoke	 one	 to	 more	 forcefully	 asking	 the	question	posed	by	Chris	Binnie	(and,	similarly,	by	Margaret	Hodge):	why	is	it	that	the	bandwagon	for	the	TTT	keeps	rolling?	One	answer,	we	would	suggest,	lies	in	the	conditions	of	possibility	for	large-scale	Mode	1	and	Mode	2	UI	projects.	These	conditions	 of	 possibility	 lie	 in	 the	 novel	 forms	 of	 financing	 and	 the	 process	 of	financialisation	 that	 has	 swept	 through	 the	water	 sector	 in	 the	UK.	 Thus,	 both	Thames	 Water	 and	 Bazalgette	 Tunnel	 Ltd	 epitomise	 a	 broader	 shift	 in	 large	infrastructure	projects.	Whereas	Thames	Water	has	 spent	much	of	 the	 last	 ten	years	 leveraging	securities	 to	sustain	high	shareholder	dividends	–	often	at	 the	expense	 of	 decaying	 infrastructure	 –	 now,	 with	 the	 development	 of	 novel	financing	mechanisms,	large	infrastructure	projects	appear	increasingly	attractive	to	 sovereign	 wealth	 funds,	 pension	 funds,	 insurance	 companies	 and	 other	institutional	 investors.	 Coming	 with	 inflation-protected	 guarantees	 from	 the	central	 government,	 new	 infrastructure	 projects,	 such	 as	 the	 Thames	 Tideway	Tunnel	 or	 the	Nine	Elms	extension	 to	 the	Northern	Line	 (Findeisen	2016),	 are	packaged	 in	 a	 way	 that	 provides	 stable,	 guaranteed	 revenue	 streams	 for	institutional	 investors.	 These	 revenue	 streams	 can	 then	 be	 transformed	 into	assets	 and	 traded	within	 secondary	markets.	Thus,	 in	 the	 following	 section	we	turn	in	greater	depth	to	this	process	of	financialisation,	before	seeking	to	answer	the	question	of	what	it	is	that	is	being	integrated	and	for	whom.		
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Financialising	infrastructure	Thames	Water	is	now	perhaps	the	iconic	example	of	a	financialised	water	services	provider.	 As	 Allen	 and	 Pryke	 (2013)	 demonstrate,	 the	 utility’s	 financial	model	differs	in	fundamental	ways	from	that	of	privatized	water	utilities	in	the	period	immediately	after	divestment	of	water	in	England	and	Wales	in	1989.	During	the	period	 between	 the	 release	 of	 the	 Thames	 Tideway	 Strategic	 Study	 and	 the	application	for	planning	permission,	several	 fundamental	changes	took	place	 in	the	corporate	profile	of	Thames	Water.	Crucially,	the	utility’s	owner	changed	from	the	German	energy	 firm	RWE	 to	a	 collection	of	 investors	 led	by	 the	Australian	investment	bank	Macquarie.	The	Macquarie	Group’s	purchase	of	Thames	resulted	in	a	fundamental	change	in	the	company’s	business	model	(Allen	and	Pryke	2014;	Bayliss	2015;	Loftus	and	March	2016):	long-term	company	debt	increased	from	£1.6	billion	in	2005	to	£10	billion;	and	over	the	same	period	dividend	payments	totalled	£1.875	billion	(Plimmer	2016)3.	A	complex	corporate	structure	developed	in	which	much	of	the	debt	accrued	by	Thames	was	acquired	through	offshore	tax	havens,	 and,	 as	 can	 be	 seen,	 in	 which	 dividend	 payments	 to	 shareholders	remained	 absurdly	 high	 given	 these	 levels	 of	 debt.	 Furthermore,	 since	 its	acquisition	by	Macquarie,	Thames	Water	and	 its	many	 subsidiaries	 and	parent	companies	have	paid	almost	no	corporate	tax	to	the	UK	government	(Allen	and	Pryke	 2013;	 Bayliss	 2015)	 provoking	 considerable	 anger.	 Following	 the	publication	 of	 its	 2012	 results,	 OFWAT’s	 chairman	 noted	 that	 Thames’	 actions	might	well	be	legal	“but	some	aspects	are	morally	questionable	in	a	vital	public	service”	(Houlder	et	al.	2013).	The	repackaging	of	risk	within	the	company	means	
																																																								3	Byatt	(2013)	talks	about	£2.2	billion	for	the	period	2006-2012.	
	 20	
that	 the	 day-to-day	 operations	 of	 abstracting,	 treating	 and	 distributing	 water	appear	to	be	of	less	importance	to	the	company	than	profiting	through	complex	financial	procedures.	While	this	financial	engineering	is	largely	hidden	from	view,	at	the	base	of	the	model	lies	the	household.	Households	are,	therefore,	responsible	for	providing	predictable	and	sustainable	revenue	streams.			The	process	of	financialisation	that	Thames	has	been	transformed	by	has	received	considerable	attention	in	recent	years	(Langley	2003,	2008;	Christophers	2013,	2014,	2015;	Lapavitsas	2013).	Although	definitions	of	financialisation	vary,	there	is	some	agreement	that	the	 locus	of	power	 in	the	economy	has	shifted	to	some	degree	 from	 the	 production	 of	 value	 to	 the	 extraction	 of	 rents.	While	 there	 is	considerable	debate	over	 the	degree	 to	which	 the	production	of	value	 remains	central	 to	 profitmaking	 as	 well	 as	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 rent	 extraction	 can	 be	divorced	 from	 the	production	of	 surplus	value,	 there	 remains	 some	agreement	that	new	actors	have	proliferated	and	that	the	influence	of	the	financial	services	sector	on	a	range	of	different	aspects	of	human	and	non-human	 life	has	grown	(Loftus	 and	 March	 2015).	 However,	 water	 remains	 a	 fundamentally	uncooperative	 commodity	 (Bakker	 2003)	 and	 the	 process	 of	 financialisation	within	the	water	sector	remains	uneven	and	complicated	(for	the	most	up-to-date	review	 of	 recent	work	 on	 the	 financialisation	 of	water,	 see	 Ahlers	 and	Merme	2016).	Indeed,	as	Bayliss	(2014;	2015)	demonstrates,	water	itself	is	far	less	likely	to	be	financialised	than	water	services	or	the	infrastructure	through	which	water	services	 are	 provided.	 A	 range	 of	 financial	 products	 has,	 therefore,	 developed	around	 both	 water	 and	 its	 attendant	 infrastructures,	 including	 water-targeted	
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investment	 funds;	 structured	 water	 products	 within	 major	 investment	 banks;	water	indexes;	or	exchange	traded	funds.			The	 so-called	 Australian	 model	 of	 infrastructure	 financing	 pioneered	 by	 the	Macquarie	Group	in	roadbuilding	in	Australia	in	the	1990s	and	exported	to	the	UK	through	Macquarie’s	ventures	into	the	water	sector	with	its	purchase	of	Thames	Water	has	been	crucial	in	transforming	water	in	England	and	Wales	over	the	last	decade	(Allen	and	Pryke	2013)	and	 it	 is	almost	 impossible	to	divorce	London’s	super	sewer	from	this	broader	shift.	Indeed	the	influence	of	financialisation	can	be	 felt	at	a	 range	of	different	 scales.	Most	obviously,	by	2010,	 it	was	clear	 that	Thames	Water	no	longer	had	the	reserves	of	capital	to	be	able	to	construct	a	tunnel	whose	cost	had	also	increased	massively	since	the	publication	of	the	TTSS.	The	National	Audit	Office	puts	it	bluntly:	Thames	Water’s	difficulties	in	paying	for	the	tunnel	result	from	a	“recent	strategy	to	increase	its	borrowing	and	pay	substantial	dividends	to	its	owners”	(NAO	2014:25).	Furthermore,	even	if	Thames	Water	was	not	 so	 heavily	 leveraged	 the	 TTT	 is	 now	 “of	 a	 size	 and	 complexity	 that	 could	threaten	 Thames	 Water’s	 ability	 to	 provide	 services	 to	 its	 customers”	 (NAO	2014:25).	It,	therefore,	became	imperative	to	develop	a	coherent	financing	model	that	could	cope	with	the	size,	cost	and	risks	associated	with	the	tunnel.			The	National	Audit	Office	(2014)	summarizes	the	different	delivery	models	that	were	 initially	 considered	 to	 develop	 the	 TTT:	 Thames	 Water	 financing;	 state	financing;	or	the	use	of	an	independent	infrastructure	provider.	The	first	option	was	rejected	outright	because	of	Thames	Water’s	debt	levels;	the	second	option	public	sector	financing	was	considered	too	problematic	in	that	it	“could	require	
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legislation	to	take	the	project	outside	the	existing	regulatory	framework”	(p.25).	Thus,	the	third	option	became	the	preferred	model	and	an	Infrastructure	Provider	(IP),	 legally	 separated	 from	 Thames	 Water,	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 Special	 Purpose	Vehicle	(SPV)	was	appointed	to	deliver	the	scheme.	Allegedly,	such	a	model	would	“help	secure	the	lowest	cost	of	capital	and	keep	costs	down	for	customers”	(NAO	2014:26).	Somewhat	troublingly,	DEFRA	only	received	two	bids	for	the	scheme.	Both	the	winning	bidder	and	the	losing	one	were	coalitions	of	investors,	bringing	together	pension-fund	and	insurance	companies.	Eventually,	OFWAT	awarded	the	licence	to	design,	build,	commission	and	maintain	the	infrastructure	to	Bazalgette	Tunnel	Ltd.	Trading	under	the	name	of	Tideway,	the	company	is	comprised	of	four	shareholders:	 insurance	 company	 Alliance;	 independent	 fund	 management	company	Dalmore	Capital	Limited;	global	infrastructure	fund	INPP	together	with	the	insurance	company	Swiss	Life	(managed	and	advised	by	sponsor	and	manager	of	infrastructures	Amber	infrastructure);	and	the	independent	fund	management	company	DIF	(Tideway	2016).	In	an	arrangement	that	appears	to	point	to	the	redundancy	of	Bazalgette	Tunnel	Ltd,	Thames	Water	will	be	the	sole	supplier	of	raw	sewage	to	the	former	and	will	also	be	 the	sole	customer	when	 it	 receives	 raw	sewage	at	 the	other	end	of	 the	tunnel.	Bazalgette	Tunnel	Ltd’s	sole	function,	its	“special	purpose”	as	an	SPV,	is	to	build	a	tunnel	and	to	transport	sewage	from	Thames	Water	back	to	Thames	Water.	While	the	stated	cost	of	the	tunnel	is	expected	to	be	£4.2	billion	at	2011	prices,	the	economic	 model	 is	 hugely	 complex	 with	 a	 multiplicity	 of	 actors	 interacting	through	 complex	 financial	 arrangements.	 The	 company	 shareholders	 have	committed	 £1.3	 billion	 (Bazalgette	 Holding	 Limited	 2016).	 Also,	 a	 further	 £1	billion	 has	 been	 committed	 through	 a	 Revolving	 Credit	 Facility	 (RCF).	
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Furthermore,	the	project	has	secured	a	35-year	loan	from	the	EIB	of	£700	million	(Investor	 report,	 2016)	 as	well	 as	 issuing	bonds	 totalling	£350	million	pounds	(Bazalgette	Holding	Limited	2016).		Despite	 the	 initial	 capital	outlay	 for	 construction	coming	 from	 the	collection	of	investors	making	up	Bazalgette	Tunnel	Ltd,	the	tunnel	will	eventually	be	paid	for	through	customer	bills.	Thames	Water’s	13.8	million	sewerage	customers	(over	20%	of	the	UK’s	overall	population)	will,	therefore,	pay	for	the	tunnel	again	and	again.	Many	of	these	customers	live	as	far	away	as	Banbury,	almost	100	miles	from	the	CSOs	that	the	tunnel	is	supposedly	a	response	to.	Annual	bill	increases	were	initially	estimated	to	be	£70-80;	however,	the	financing	mechanisms	put	in	place	have	reduced	average	increases	to	roughly	£20-25	per	annum	(DEFRA	2015b).	A	£7	surcharge	was	already	included	in	customer’s	2015	bills	to	cover	project	costs	incurred	 by	 Thames	 Water	 (DEFRA	 2015a:	 15)	 and	 this	 charge	 will	 increase	incrementally	 as	 the	 tunnel	 is	 constructed.	 The	 “average	 increase”	 referred	 to	masks	large	differences,	depending	on	whether	or	not	a	household	is	on	a	metered	supply	and,	in	the	case	of	the	latter,	the	size	of	that	household.	With	construction	already	having	started,	the	TTT	will	eventually	use	four	tunnel	boring	machines	to	construct	the	main	spine	of	the	network	before	connecting	the	worst	CSOs	to	this	spine	at	different	sites	along	the	Thames.	All	work	should	be	completed	by	2023.		Thames	Water	was	no	longer	in	a	position	to	be	able	to	construct	a	“honking	great	tunnel”	given	that	the	financial	model	it	had	developed	had	essentially	starved	the	utility	 of	 necessary	 resources.	 While	 Mode	 2	 UI	 poster	 children,	 such	 as	 the	
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Thames	Water	Desalination	Plant	 at	Beckton	 could	be	pursued,	Thames	Water	lacked	 the	 ability	 to	 secure	 financing	 for	 a	 project	 as	 ambitious	 as	 the	 TTT.	Nevertheless,	 it	 had	 prepared	 the	 ground	 for	 a	 new	 coalition	 of	 investors	 to	emulate	the	financial	model	rolled	out	in	London,	a	model	imported	from	Australia	through	 the	 Macquarie	 group.	 Thus,	 the	 hydrosocial	 cycle	 had	 been	 part	financialised	by	Thames,	this	process	was	closed	by	the	entry	of	Bazalgette	Tunnel	Ltd.	While	the	NAO	presents	the	SPV	as	the	only	viable	option,	its	conditions	of	possibility	 lie	 in	 the	 process	 of	 financialisation	 embarked	 on	 by	 Thames.	 The	reason	why	this	process	of	 financialisation	provided	such	conducive	conditions	are	several,	ranging	from	the	socio-ecological	to	the	rates	of	return	available,	from	the	 ‘real’	 to	the	 ‘fictitious’.	First,	as	Byatt	(2013)	notes,	 from	2006	onwards	the	high	dividend	payments	made	to	shareholders	appeared	to	result	in	a	reduction	in	 investments	 in	 the	 existing	 network.	 For	 Byatt,	 the	 fact	 that	 Bazalgette’s	intercepting	 sewers	 appear	 to	 be	 running	 close	 to	 capacity	 even	 during	 dry	weather	 implies	 that	 the	 problem	 could	 lie	 in	 groundwater	 infiltration	 of	 the	sewer	 network.	 As	 argued	 elsewhere	 in	 Byatt’s	 paper,	 the	 gearing	 of	 Thames	Water	from	2006	onwards	has	meant	that	it	is	in	no	position	to	be	able	to	finance	the	 construction	 of	 the	 TTT.	 Instead,	 a	 separate	 Infrastructure	 Provider	 was	required.	Nevertheless,	if	that	Infrastructure	Provider	appears	separate	in	name	and	legal	status,	it	remains	utterly	tied	to	Thames.			Second,	 crucial	 for	 these	 investors	 is	 a	 steady,	 predictable,	 annualised	 rate	 of	return	on	their	investment.	A	huge	tunnel	underneath	the	Thames,	taking	7	years	to	construct	and	carrying	a	mix	of	human	sewage	and	stormwater	may	not	seem	a	 particularly	 good	 candidate	 for	 making	 money;	 however,	 payments	 for	 the	
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tunnel	will	continue	to	be	made	by	an	increase	in	household	bills,	which	although	increasing	 incrementally	 over	 coming	 years,	 has	 already	 started	 to	 appear	 on	customer	bills.	Thus,	the	tightly	regulated	sector	ensures	that	before	any	digging	in	the	Thames	has	even	started,	the	Thames	Tideway	Tunnel	is	generating	returns	for	the	investors	involved	in	the	project.	As	mentioned	before,	original	projections	for	the	likely	annual	increases	to	consumer	bills	were	in	the	range	of	£70-80,	based	on	OFWAT’s	calculations	of	what	would	be	necessary	 for	any	 firm	to	satisfy	 its	investors.	OFWAT	made	this	calculation	on	the	basis	of	the	Weighted	Average	Cost	of	Capital	(WACC).	It	was,	therefore,	something	of	a	surprise	when	Bazalgette’s	bid	came	 in	with	a	WACC	that	was	1.1%	lower	 than	the	average	granted	 for	water	utilities	in	OFWAT’s	2014	price	review.	The	average	WACC	granted	by	OFWAT	in	the	 2014	 price	 review	 was	 already	 over	 1%	 lower	 than	 that	 granted	 in	 the	previous	round	(3.74%	compared	to	5.1%),	suggesting	a	gradual	erosion	of	the	returns	being	made	to	investors	across	the	water	sector.	In	the	case	of	the	TTT,	the	good	news	for	bill	payers	was	that	this	considerably	lower	WACC	meant	that	average	bills	were	likely	to	increase	by	only	£20-30	per	household.	According	to	the	 consultancy	 Oxera	 (2015)	 the	 reasons	 for	 this	 lower	 WACC	 appear	 to	 be	related	to	the	fact	that:	borrowing	costs	remain	at	all	time	low	(something	OFWAT	rather	catastrophically	failed	to	take	into	account	in	the	previous	price	review);	Bazalgette	 is	not	currently	servicing	debts,	so	all	new	borrowing	will	be	at	 this	lower	rate;	government	backing	has	ensured	that	risks	are	reduced;	and	OFWAT	will	provide	a	variety	of	“regulatory	shields”	enabling	Bazalgette	to	earn	a	return	on	next	year’s	spend	and	enabling	it	to	make	adjustments	to	allow	for	the	cost	of	debt.	 The	model	 of	 using	 the	 SPV	 is	 therefore	 considerably	 advantageous	over	other	 forms	 of	 financing.	 Thus,	 the	 TTT	 appears	 to	 investors	 as	 a	 low-risk,	
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government-backed,	 and	 inflation	 protected	 investment.	 As	 Ahlers	 and	Merme	(2014,	 2016)	 argue,	 it	 is	 far	 easier	 to	 attract	 institutional	 investors	 for	 such	projects	 than	 it	would	be	 to	bring	about	a	coalition	of	 investors	 for	 the	kind	of	piecemeal	 –	 albeit	 far	more	 integrated	 –	 solution	proposed	by	 those	 favouring	SuDS.			Third,	and	 finally,	perhaps	more	 important	 than	the	direct	returns	 to	 investors	made	 possible	 by	 the	 TTT	 are	 the	 revenue	 streams	 which	 it	 enables.	 These	revenue	streams	can	be	securitised	and	sold	on	as	assets	within	financial	markets.	Thus,	under	conditions	of	financialisation,	we	witness	not	only	a	changing	makeup	of	investors	profiting	directly	from	water	infrastructure,	we	see	the	emergence	of	a	whole	shadow	economy	that	is	not	subject	to	the	formal	regulation	of	OFWAT.	A	narrow	focus	on	direct	returns	to	investors	tells	us	far	less	about	the	forms	of	rent	extraction	now	animating	investment	decisions	within	the	sector,	which	are	more	focused	on	the	capture	of	rents	than	the	profits	to	be	generated	from	the	direct	sale	of	water	and	wastewater	services.			
Integrating	what	and	for	whom?	Writing	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 London	 has	 become	 “a	 city	 of	 holes”,	 Edwin	Heathcote	(2016),	the	architecture	correspondent	for	the	Financial	Times,	notes:		“As	 the	 capital	 grows,	 it	 goes	 through	waves	 of	 rebuilding,	 each	 purporting	 to	address	a	dominant	issue.	In	the	late	19th	century	it	was	slum	clearance;	after	the	second	world	 war	 it	 was	 the	 rebuilding	 of	 a	 city	 devastated	 by	 bombing	 as	 a	physical	expression	of	a	new	welfare	state;	 in	 the	1980s	 the	rebuilding	was	an	
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effort	to	revitalise	the	city	as	a	global	financial	centre.	And	now	—	what	exactly?... The	chief	function	of	London,	today,	it	would	seem,	is	to	convert	space	into	money.”		With	 characteristic	 eloquence,	 Heathcote	 goes	 on	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	conversion	 of	 space	 into	 money	 takes	 place	 above	 and	 below	 ground.	 Holes	punched	 in	 the	 surface	 enable	 rents	 to	 be	 extracted	 from	 the	 tunnels	 they	facilitate;	from	the	evisceration	of	the	built	environments	that	preceded	them;	and	from	 the	new	machines	 for	 investment	constructed	 in	 their	wake.	The	Thames	Tideway	 Tunnel	 is	 one	 crucial	 part	 in	 the	 remaking	 of	 the	 fabric	 of	 London.	Nevertheless,	London’s	super	sewer	purports	to	be	a	necessary	response	to	the	multiple	challenges	facing	the	city.	Cloaked	in	the	ambition	of	the	Victorians,	the	TTT	 appears	 to	 be	 the	 only	 viable	 option	 enabling	 a	 clean	 Thames	 for	 future	generations.		Nevertheless,	as	many	have	pointed	out,	there	are	alternatives	–	more	integrated	and	less	costly.	However,	these	alternatives	do	not	provide	such	fertile	terrain	for	rent	extraction.	Differing	visions	of	integration	come	to	be	contested	within	the	differing	viewpoints	of	how	best	to	respond	to	a	polluted	Thames.	Nevertheless,	the	 financial	 model	 adopted	 by	 Thames	 Water	 and	 now	 pursued	 even	 more	effectively	 by	 its	 offspring	 Bazalgette	 Tunnel	 Ltd	 only	 appears	 to	 provide	conditions	that	are	ripe	for	large	infrastructure.	It	is	therefore	far	harder	to	extract	rents	 from	 the	 more	 piecemeal	 proposals	 for	 Integrated	 Water	 Resources	Management.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Beckton	 wastewater	 treatment	 works,	financialisation	 enabled	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 pioneering	 desalination	 plant.	Although	not	responding	to	any	clear	need	in	the	city,	the	plant	was	modelled	on	
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a	 form	of	Mode	2	UI	 and	 could	be	marketed	as	 a	 response	 to	 the	Food-Water-Energy	 nexus.	 Once	 again	 in	 the	 case	 of	 that	 plant,	 demand-side	 solutions	 to	pressure	on	groundwater	resources	were	rejected	in	favour	of	infrastructure	that	might	better	guarantee	stable	returns	–	whether	used	or	not.	The	Thames	Tideway	Tunnel,	in	contrast,	does	not	even	appear	to	base	its	credentials	on	a	form	of	Mode	2	UI:	instead,	it	heralds	a	return	to	the	integrated	infrastructural	ideal	of	Mode	1	UI,	albeit	one	infused	with	a	certain	nostalgia	for	the	Victorian	past.	Rather	than	a	forward-looking	vision	of	integration,	for	many,	the	super	sewer	is	an	outdated,	top-heavy	white	elephant.			For	an	answer	to	the	question	of	why	London	now	has	a	vast	tunnel	instead	of	an	integrated	response	to	the	problems	of	the	hydrosocial	cycle,	we	therefore	need	to	follow	Heathcote	(2016)	back	into	the	city	of	holes.	Here	we	find	a	coalition	of	institutional	investors	able	to	assemble	different	aspects	of	London’s	hydrosocial	cycle	into	a	vast	machine	for	making	profits.	Financial	and	political	interests	come	to	be	integrated	into	an	elite	fix	that	will	generate	returns	for	the	pension	funds,	insurance	companies	and	sovereign	wealth	funds	now	integral	to	the	hydrosocial	cycle	of	 the	 city.	Rather	 than	an	ambitious	project	 to	avoid	a	polluted	Thames,	generate	clean	energy,	and	build	creatively	on	the	challenges	of	the	water-energy	nexus,	the	Thames	Tideway	Tunnel	is	a	concrete	tunnel	for	extracting	rents,	a	pure	financial	asset.	Viewed	in	this	way,	the	tunnel	is	a	further	blight	on	the	efforts	to	build	a	more	progressive	socio-ecological	future	for	the	city.		
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